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Introduction
What is the defi nition of Socialism? 
Conventionally it is understood to mean a sys-
tem where all or most of capital as a means of 
production is owned by the state. In China, 
however, under Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic 
banner of "Economic development is our pri-
ority above anything (Fazhan caishi yingdaoli)," 
ownership of capital has become pluralistic, 
overriding the conventional framework of So-
cialism. 
Since the mid 1990s, the presence of 
private and foreign-capital companies has 
grown rapidly as China made great strides 
in its transition to a market economy, which 
in turn has signifi cantly attenuated the Chi-
nese Communist Party's insistence on state 
ownership of capital. The resolution of the 
16th National Congress of the CPC to rec-
ognize admittance of private entrepreneurs 
into the Party symbolizes the change in par-
ty line towards the system of ownership. This 
National Congress session basically eliminat-
ed what had been left of the political restric-
tions against ownership system reform.1 Priva-
tization of state-owned enterprises, the fi nal 
stage of ownership system reform, has been 
launched as an offi cial policy in 2001. Eco-
nomic reforms in China from now onward 
will likely develop with the privatization of 
large enterprises as the central issue.
Compared to privatization of small and 
medium sized enterprises, which has already 
made a substantial progress, privatization of 
large-scale enterprises involves several com-
plicated issues. One of the important issues 
is what kinds of agent are going to take ini-
tiative in the process of privatization, i.e. who 
buys enterprises to be privatized and controls 
them thereafter. Those who take initiative in 
the privatization process need to be capable 
of providing effective monitoring of the cor-
porate management after privatization.
In this context, this chapter will cov-
er the recent chain of events in the privatiza-
tion of large enterprises, focusing especially 
on companies listed on the stock exchanges.2
With the setback in the policy for market sales 
of state-owned shares (guoyou gu), the focus 
of large company privatization has shifted to 
purchase by strategic investors as the main 
constituents. In this chapter, we shall investi-
gate institutional investors, management exec-
utives, private companies, and foreign-capital 
companies, as agents which will take initiative 
in the process of privatization.
5.1 The Tide of Large Enterprise 
Privatization
5.1.1 Origins of the Divestiture Policy 
of State-owned Shares
(1) From Conversion to Joint Stock Corpora-
tions to Complete Privatization
Since the start of the 1990s, China has 
been promoting the creation of joint stock 
companies and the listing of stocks on stock 
exchanges for comparatively large state-
owned companies. The tempo of stock list-
ing has accelerated since 1996 when transfor-
mation of state-owned enterprises into joint 
stock corporations was fi rmly established as 
a part of the Party's offi cial policy line (Table 
1). The majority of the companies currently 
listed are joint stock companies that were es-
tablished through the reorganization of state-
owned enterprises.
As was the cases with privatization of 
large public enterprises in market econo-
mies, transformation from a state-owned com-
pany into a joint stock corporation and stock 
exchange listing are usually the fi rst steps to-
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wards complete privatization. In the case of 
China however, the circumstances are differ-
ent. Regardless of the offi cially claimed aims, 
the principal goal that motivates stock mar-
ket listing is capital procurement through 
the stock markets, and it is not the case that 
complete privatization has been assumed as 
the target from the beginning. In fact, even 
though the number of company listings on 
the stock markets is increasing, the ratio of 
state shares (guojia gu) held by the govern-
ment is hardly declining. If the state-owned le-
gal entity shares (guoyou faren gu) are includ-
ed, state-owned shares in the broadest sense 
account for about 60% of issued shares.
In this chapter privatization of large 
companies implies the sales of all (or a ma-
jor part of the) state-owned shares in joint 
stock corporations with state-owned parent 
companies, to the private entities. Promotion 
of privatization through sales of state-owned 
shares has come into prominence with the op-
portunity of the previous 15th National Con-
gress of the CPC (held in September 1997), 
and has initiated as an actual policy based on 
the Resolution of 4th Plenary Session of the 
15th CCCPC (held in September 1999). As 
the Party basically abandoned in effect its pre-
vious persistence on state-ownership of capital 
at this National Congress, move towards com-
plete privatization has been established as a 
de-facto offi cial policy line. Let us overview 
how this policy came to be.
At the 15th National Congress in 1997, 
the idea of "strategic adjustment of the state-
owned economy" was fi rst put forward in the 
report of the General Secretary. While main-
taining and strengthening the controlling po-
sition of state-owned capital in the "important 
industries and fi elds relating to the survival 
of the national economy," this policy allowed 
for withdrawal of state capital from the other, 
non-strategic, industries and fi elds. The line 
between strategic and non-strategic fi elds was 
less than clear-cut, which offered considerable 
leeway to more widespread privatization. With 
this opportunity, privatization of small and 
medium enterprises under the jurisdiction of 
local governments got into full swing.
Strong resistance inside the Party, op-
posed to the policy line of "strategic adjust-
ment," still remained then. At the 4th Plenary 
Session of the 15th CCCPC held in Septem-
ber 1999, however, the Party reconfi rmed the 
promotion of the strategic adjustment, and 
narrowed down further the fi elds where state 
capital control was to be maintained. Further-
more, the divestiture policy of state-owned 
Table 1  Development of Stock Listing and Composition of Stock Types
Negotiable stock total
 A share
 B share
 H share
Non-negotiable stock total
 State share
 Legal persons' share
 Others
Grand total
51
n.a.
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
322
3,474
529
9,842
744
17,529
851
19,506
949
26,471
1,088
48,091
1,160
43,522
Source: Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Jiben Fenxi 2000, edited by Zhongchengxin Guoji Xinyong Pingji Youxian Zeren Gongsi,
Zhongguo Kexue Jishu Chubanshe, 2000; and the website for the China Securities Regulatory Commission          
Number of companies
listing stock
Market capitalization
(100 mil. RMB)
31.9
15.4
16.5
0
68.1
44.6
22.1
1.5
100
1992
28.8
16.8
6.4
5.7
71.2
48.1
21.3
1.7
100
32.9
20.9
6.1
6
67.1
42.7
23.1
1.3
100
180
3,531
290
3,691
41.3
21
6.7
7.7
64.6
38.9
24.5
1.2
100
35.2
21.9
6.4
6.9
64.8
37.7
24.9
2.2
100
34.6
23
6.4
5.2
65.4
35.4
26.7
3.3
100
34
24.1
5.4
4.5
66
34.3
28.2
3.4
100
35.2
26.9
4.3
3.9
64.8
31.6
29.6
3.6
100
36.6
29
4.2
3.5
63.3
37.1
24.9
1.3
100
36.6
25.7
3.1
6.4
65.3
46.2
18.3
0.8
100
(%)
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shares was clarifi ed as, "select a few stock list-
ed companies in which the state is the major 
shareholder, and where confi dence is high 
and the growth potential great, and sell a part 
of the state-owned shares on the premise that 
control by the state capital is maintained." In 
response to the Party resolution, the Minis-
try of Finance presented the targets of reduc-
ing the ratio of state-owned shares (includ-
ing state-owned legal entity shares) in listed 
companies belonging to non-strategic indus-
tries to 51% in the fi rst stage, and 30% in the 
second stage. The divestiture of state-owned 
shares was thus established as a government 
policy.
The policy line of "strategic adjust-
ment," entailed the withdrawal of state own-
ership from non-strategic areas and participa-
tion and promotion of non-state ownership, 
while at the same time, at least in principle, 
strengthening state ownership in strategic ar-
eas. Notwithstanding what is said by the slo-
gan, actual development reveals that the Par-
ty and the government are inclined to place 
more emphasis on pushing through priva-
tization on an extended scale. In the "10th 
5-year Plan Industrial Restructuring Vision" 
proclaimed by the State Economic and Trade 
Commission in October 2001 as the guideline 
of industrial policy for the 10th 5-year Plan 
period, a policy line was set forth that went a 
step beyond the 4th Plenary Session resolu-
tion on the distribution of state capital (Table 
2). The vision emphasizes control through 
state ownership only on the "core fi eld" of the 
munition industry, while the overall message 
was apparently meant to be promoting entry 
of non-state capital to a wider range of indus-
tries. 
(2) Background for Policy of Sales of State-
owned Shares
There are two major objectives that in-
duced the Party and the government to em-
bark on the drastic policy of promoting priva-
tization through sales of state-owned shares.
Correction of flaws in corporate governance
The average rate of state-owned shares 
in listed companies is around 30% to 40%, 
and in not a few cases the ratio is over 50%. 
The government bureau concerned or the 
parent state-owned company usually exercis-
es the shareholder authority for state-owned 
shares. When the government bureau exer-
cises the shareholder authority, the risk of in-
tervention in the company's management by 
the bureau is substantial. In the event that 
the shareholder authority for the state-owned 
shares is entrusted to the management, the 
risk of insider control increases due to the 
fact that the management is able to monop-
olize the company's decision-making process 
as the representative of the largest stockhold-
er. In order to rectify this kind of situation, it 
is essential to reduce the rate of state-owned 
shares and introduce third-party shareholders 
that can effectively monitor the management.
Procurement of funds for re-capitalizing public 
pension fund
However, the start of the drastic poli-
cy of selling state-owned shares, beginning at 
the end of 1999, was due more to the pressing 
need for procurement of funds through sales, 
rather than for the original purpose of cor-
recting the fl aws in corporate governance.
From the end of the 1980s, China has 
been constructing a social security system cen-
tered on pensions. The government has been 
putting great effort on building the public 
pension system in order to prepare for the 
rapid aging of society brought about by the 
one-child policy. The new pension system 
transformed the pay-as-you-go system (system 
that fi nances pension expenditures to pen-
sion recipients through the collection of in-
surance premiums from people currently in 
the workforce), into a system principally com-
posed of the fully-funded system (system that 
uses reserves built up during a worker's work-
ing years for government funding of pensions 
after retirement).
The problem is how to fi nance pension 
52 China's New Leadership
benefi ts to retirees who have not accumulated 
a reserve in the past, during the transition pe-
riod from the pay-as-you-go system to the fully 
funded system. The pension liability that oc-
curs in the transition period is estimated by 
the State Council to be about 3.7 trillion RMB 
or 40% of the GDP (Caijing, No.3/4, Febru-
ary 5, 2002).
In the northeast region, where the soci-
ety is aging rapidly, the income and expendi-
ture imbalance in the pension fund is already 
coming to the surface. In 1997, fi ve cities na-
tionwide were with the income and expen-
diture imbalance, increased to 21 cities by 
the following year, and a defi cit of 5.2 billion 
RMB occurred in the fund income and ex-
penditures at the national level in the same 
year. Although the fund was back in the black 
on the national level by the following year, 
the income and expenditure imbalance con-
tinued to grow on the regional level. In 1999, 
the region with the imbalance grew to 25 cit-
ies, and in the four provinces/cities includ-
ing Tianjin and Jilin, the funds accumulated 
in the past had almost all been used up (Far 
Eastern Economic Review, May 30, 2002).
Table 2  Evolution of Policies Related to Allocation of State Capital
Policy Vision for Industrial Structural
Adjustment for the 15th 5-year plan
period (Oct. 2001)
Policies Related to Allocation of State Capital
Note: Sections (1) and (2) are translated in full.  Section (3) is an abridged translation of relevant sections.
Sources: 
(1) Guojia Jingji Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui (ed.) [1998, 1-12]
(2) Zhongyang Caijing Lingdao Xiaozu Bangongshi et.al (eds.) [1999, 1-28]
(3) State Economic and Trade Commission website
 (http://www.setc.gov.cn/gjjmwznzn/gyswgh/200206240011.htm)
15th National Congress Report
(Sept. 1997)
Resolution of Fourth Plenary Session
of the Fifteenth Central Committee
of CPC (Sept. 1999)
- Maintain dominant position of the state capital in industries and sectors that 
are vital to the national economy.
- In other areas, strengthen priority issues and improve overall standards of 
state assets through reorganization of assets and structural adjustment.
- In general, industries and sectors that should be controlled by the national 
economy are as follows: industries that are connected with national security, 
natural monopoly industries, industries that supply important public goods, 
and important enterprises affiliated with core industries and high-
technology.
- In other areas, strengthen priority issues and improve overall standards of 
state assets through reorganization of assets and structural adjustment.
- State capital must maintain absolute control of core sectors of national 
defense industries.
- In sectors that provide important public goods as well as natural monopoly 
sectors, it will be necessary for state capital to have a dominant position for 
the time being.  In such sectors as electrical supply networks, steam supply, 
waterworks, gas, tree cutting and transport, land petroleum, valuable metals, 
and rare and rare-earth metals, state capital will continue to control capital 
in priority industries.  At the same time, introduction of non-state capital will 
be promoted, and the operational efficiency of capital will be improved.
- In sectors that manifest the country’s overall strength—such as 
petrochemicals, automobiles, information industries, machines and 
equipment, and high-technology—state capital will continue to have a 
dominant position in a small number of state enterprises.  At the same time, 
joint development of a variety of economic elements will be encouraged.
- In strategic fields that manifest the country’s competitive power—such as 
information technology, biotechnology, new materials technology, and 
advanced manufacturing technology—state capital will serve to guide and 
promote.  In general, the national government will not participate in 
construction of factories by releasing capital; instead, it will support 
procurement of project capital, basic research, and applied research, and 
through these policies, it will promote general investment and international 
capital investment.
- In general strategic sectors, efforts will be made to raise the operating 
efficiency of state capital as well as overall standards primarily through 
market mechanisms.
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Against the backdrop of these condi-
tions, the government has been expanding 
social security payments since 1998 (Table 3). 
The social security payments have been calcu-
lated as a national expenditure item since the 
settlement of accounts in 1998. The social se-
curity payments that did not account for more 
than 1.4% of the entire expenditures in 1998, 
grew to exceed 5% by 2001. The State Coun-
cil established a nationwide social security 
fund (China National Social Security Fund) 
in 1999 in order to cover the income and ex-
penditure imbalance of the regional funds, 
and has been contributing about 30 billion 
RMB annually ever since.
Fiscal defi cits have been expanding rap-
idly due to increase in public investment ex-
penditures for boosting domestic demands in 
recent years, and they have reached the 250 
billion RMB level (Figure 1). In the estimates 
of the Labor and Social Security Ministry, the 
current pension system is maintained, and 
based on the premise of no major changes 
in the population trend, in the next 30 years 
an average annual defi cit of 100 billion RMB 
is expected for the pension fund (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, same issue).
5.1.2 Setbacks for the Policy to Sell 
State-owned Shares
(1) Start of State-owned Shares Sales
The government decided to adopt the 
policy of selling state-owned shares in an ef-
fort to address the pressing problem of avoid-
ing the risk of a fi nancial crisis. The fi rst tri-
al was at the end of 1999 when the policy was 
carried out for an initial two listed companies 
on a limited scale. However, owing mainly to 
high prices in relation to the sluggish pros-
pects of the companies, investors reacted un-
enthusiastically and a substantial part of the 
shares remained unsold. The stock prices fell 
immediately after the sale, leaving the pur-
chasers bearing a capital loss.
After an reconsideration of a year and 
a half following the failed fi rst trial, the State 
Council issued the "Interim Regulations Re-
lating to the Management of Social Securi-
ty Capital Procurement Using the Release of 
State-owned Shares" in June 2001, resuming 
eventually the policy of selling state-owned 
shares on a full-fl edged scale. Under these 
regulations, when state-owned companies re-
organized as joint stock corporations offer 
shares publicly or increase their capital, they 
Table 3  Glowing Government Expenditure on
              Social Security 
1998
1999
2000
2001
Social security subsidiaries
Social security subsidiaries
National social security fund
Total
Social security subsidiaries
National social security fund
Total
Social security subsidiaries
National social security fund
Total
Note: Budget items related to social security did not exist
          prior to 1998.
Source: Prepared from Zhongguo Caizheng Nianjian,
              various years.
1.39%
4.73%
5.20%
5.21%
150.0
343.6
280.0
623.6
526.0
300.0
826.0
672.0
310.0
982.0
0.0
168.2
0.0
168.2
460.0
0.0
460.0
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Budget Items Related to
Social Security
Share in
 Annual
Expenditure
Total
Closing
(100 mil.
RMB)
Budget
(100 mil.
RMB)
Year
 Figure 1  Glowing Fiscal Deficit
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
12.8
14.6
19.2
17.0
22.5
24.8
26.6
28.6
33.5
32.7
31.2
28.1
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
100 mil.RMB
Fiscal deficit (left axis)
Ratio of dependence on
government bonds (right axis)
40.0
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
%
Note: Ratio of dependence on government bonds = income from
           government bond issues/government income
Source: Based on China Statistical Yearbook, various years.
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are obligated to sell state-owned shares equal 
to 10% of the capital procurement amount, 
and pay all the sales revenues to the Nation-
al Social Security Fund. In May 2001, just be-
fore the announcement was made, the Chi-
nese stock markets reached record highs, and 
under the plan, revenues of 50 billion RMB 
could be obtained within the year through 
the sale of state-owned shares.
Unfortunately, the policy for selling 
state-owned shares based on the "Interim Reg-
ulations" ended in a dramatic failure. Just 
around the time of the interim regulation an-
nouncement, stock prices began to drop sud-
denly, ending up with a depreciation of over 
30% by October. Finally, the government was 
forced to declare a temporary suspension of 
the interim measures on October 22. The 
sales amount was far below estimates at 12.2 
billion RMB, the aggregate capitalization of 
the stock markets shrank by close to 1 trillion 
RMB from the time of the peak, which result-
ed in backing up investors fears over the poli-
cy of selling state-owned shares.
(2) Change in Policy
The trial sale of state-owned shares that 
began after full preparations and ended in a 
setback, made it unavoidable that the govern-
ment revise its policy fundamentally. In June 
2002, the government announced to perma-
nently suspend the related provisions of the 
interim regulations, except for listings on 
overseas stock markets, and decided to give 
up the release of state-owned shares on the 
domestic stock markets.
The series of events showed that the 
policy for selling state-owned shares on the 
stock markets itself was essentially fl awed. 
Shares owned by households are at a compar-
atively low rate of 6% of household fi nancial 
assets, offering a lot of potential for growth. 
However, Chinese stocks are extremely vol-
atile compared to international standards, 
leaving shareholders with a lot of risk. For 
this reason, it cannot be expected that house-
holds with actively increase their purchase of 
shares. As long as stock purchases by house-
holds, which represent the largest share of fi -
nancing surplus, do not expand, the sale of 
state-owned shares through the stock markets 
will be greatly impeded.
In order to lessen the risk for stock in-
vestors, it is necessary to increase the stabili-
ty of the fi nancial performance of listed com-
panies, which in turn requires signifi cant 
improvement in corporate governance. This 
is hard to be achieved as long as the rate of 
state-owned shares remains high. On the 
other hand, in order to ease the pressure 
that covering the pension fund shortage has 
placed on the state fi nances, a fi xed cash fl ow 
needs to be secured from state-owned shares, 
which exceed 2 trillion RMB measured by the 
aggregate market value.
As long as the government tries to ad-
vance sales of state-owned shares through 
sales on the stock markets to general inves-
tors, it will not be able to escape from this di-
lemma. It is imperative to seek out investors 
that have both the intention and the ability to 
contribute towards improving management 
effi ciency of listed companies.
When the release of state-owned shares 
was suspended, the State Council announced 
to investigate, as alternative measures, trans-
ferring the state-owned shares needed to cov-
er the pension fund shortage to the nation-
al social security fund, and securing cash 
fl ow through sales to "strategic investors" or 
through dividends. Strategic investors as en-
visaged by the government imply agents such 
as institutional investors, private companies, 
and foreign-capital companies. In particu-
lar, private companies are already increasing 
their presence in taking initiatives in the pro-
cess of privatization through the purchase of 
listed state-owned companies. In addition to 
this, there are also an increasing number of 
cases where privatization is being carried out 
through the purchase of state-owned shares 
by employees inside the companies, and man-
agers and management executives in partic-
ular. In the next part, we will investigate the 
55Chapter 5  Privatization of State-owned Enterprises:Prospects after the "Socialist Market Economy"
limits and possibilities of each of them as 
agents of privatization.
5.2 Agents in Privatization
5.2.1 Who will Take Initiatives in 
Privatization?
Agents who will take initiatives in the 
divestiture of state-owned shares should be 
capable of making contributions to the im-
provement of corporate governance of com-
panies subject to privatization. The dispersion 
of shares widely among small-scale general in-
vestors is not always desirable from the stand-
point of corporate governance since it is like-
ly to lead to a lack of effective monitoring on 
the management. 
5.2.2 Institutional Investors
In recent years the Chinese govern-
ment has begun attaching greater importance 
to the development of institutional investors 
as the agents who are expected to be princi-
pal actors in the corporate governance of list-
ed companies. According to the estimates of 
a senior economist affi liated with the People's 
Bank of China, 40% of shares in circulation 
are being held by investment funds if those 
not offi cially approved are included. These in-
vestment funds are, however, focused on spec-
ulative short term buying and selling to date 
and are far from qualifi ed as agents of sound 
corporate governance.
Institutional investors such as pension 
funds and insurance companies are more 
qualifi ed in this sense since the nature of 
their funds dictates that they are likely to have 
Figure 2  Management-Buyout of Tianmu Pharmaceutical
Qian Yongdao
(Chairman)
Gao Hong
(General Manager)
Employee Shareholders
Association
Hangzhou Tianmu Yong’an  Group Limited Company
(Hangzhou Tianmu Herbal Medicine Factory, previously)
Lin’an Tianmushan
Stone Company
Lin’an City Pharmaceutical
Packaging Factory
Tianmu Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
Major shareholders
Source) Compiled by author based on New Fortune, August 2002 issue and securities-related websites.
65%
30.16% 12.46% 2.41%
100%
10% 25%
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a perspective oriented towards long-term sta-
ble earnings instead of short-term speculative 
gains with high risks accruing from them. The 
State Council has set forth a policy of entrust-
ing the management of the national social se-
curity fund to fund management companies 
and is now in the process of selection. The 
government is also taking measures to intro-
duce foreign capital to the fund management 
with a view to promoting improvement in the 
management level of fund management busi-
ness in China (to be discussed later).
5.2.3 Buyouts by Executives and Em-
ployees
In the case of privatization of small and 
medium companies, management buyouts 
(MBO) and management-employee buyouts 
(MEBO) are used widely. Even for companies 
or listed companies that are comparatively 
large scale, there are cases of privatization of 
through MBO or MEBO.3
Case 1: Tianmu Pharmaceutical
Let us look at Tianmu Pharmaceutical 
Co., Ltd. as a model example of a listed com-
pany MBO (Figure 2). The parent of Tian-
mu Pharmaceutical is Hangzhou Tianmushan 
Pharmaceutical Factory, a state-owned manu-
facturer of Chinese herbal medicines belong-
ing to Lin'an City, Zhejiang Province. Tianmu 
Pharmaceutical, with Tianmushan Pharma-
ceutical Factory as its principal shareholder, 
had its shares listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in 1993. Its total assets are 400 mil-
lion RMB, and it is a comparatively small com-
pany among the listed pharmaceutical com-
panies.
In 2000, the principal shareholder, Tian-
mushan Pharmaceutical Factory was reorga-
nized as Hangzhou Tianmu Yong'an (Group) 
Corporation. At the same time, the company 
ownership was distributed in the form of 65% 
for Qian Yongtao, the manager, 10% for Gao 
Hong, a company executive, and 25% for the 
employee shareholders. In doing this, Tian-
mu Pharmaceutical turned into a company 
where the manager is the owner controlling 
the assets. Qian Yongtao joined Tianmushan 
Pharmaceutical Factory in 1965, and after be-
coming General Manager in the mid 1980s, 
he contributed greatly to development of the 
company that was no more than a middle-
scale local manufacturer. Privatization meant 
the legal establishment of ownership rights to 
back up the actual situation where Qian Yong-
tao had de facto personal management con-
trol of the company. The indirect format of 
buying out the principal shareholding com-
pany meant a reduction in the funds needed 
for the buyout and the avoidance of the sud-
den changes in investor structure of the listed 
company.
Case 2: Dazhong Transportation & Dazhong 
Technologies
Instead of an individual manager, there 
are not a few cases of employees as a group 
taking initiatives for privatization. A typical ex-
ample of this type is Shanghai Dazhong Taxi 
(Figure 3).
Shanghai Dazhong Taxi (Dazhong Taxi, 
hereafter) reorganized its business in the old 
city of Shanghai (Puxi district) as Shanghai 
Dazhong Taxi Co., Ltd (Dazhong Taxi Co., 
Ltd, hereafter) and listed it in 1992, and at 
the same time Dazhong Taxi reorganized its 
business in Pudong district as Pudong Da-
zhong Taxi Co., Ltd. (hereafter Pudong Taxi 
Co., Ltd) and listed it with controlling capital 
held by Dazhong Taxi Co., Ltd.
In view of increasingly severe compe-
tition in taxi business in Shanghai, in 1997 
both listed companies decided to broadly re-
organize their ownership structures. First the 
employees of both companies made an invest-
ment of 70 million RMB to establish the Da-
zhong employee shareholders association. 
Under China's current regulations, there are 
many restrictions on employee shareholder 
associations carrying out economic activities 
such as share ownership without the status of 
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a corporate entity. For this reason, by under-
taking a capital increase for Dazhong Enter-
prise Management Corporation, which was 
an already existing subsidiary, in the name of 
the labor union, and taking capital control, 
and by transferring 20.08% of the 33.19% of 
Pudong Taxi Co., Ltd.'s shares held by Da-
zhong Taxi Co., Ltd. in the past to Dazhong 
Enterprise Management Corporation, indi-
rect capital control by employee of Pudong 
Taxi Co., Ltd. was realized.
Then in 1999, the name of Dazhong 
Taxi Co., Ltd. was changed to Dazhong Trans-
portation Co., Ltd., and third party allotment 
capital increase was carried out with Pudong 
Taxi Co., Ltd. as the receiving party. In this 
Figure 3  Management-Employee Buyout of Dazhong Transportation and Dazhong
                Technologies 
Phase 1: 
Privatization of Dazhong Technologies (Shanghai Pudong Dazhong Taxi, previously) in 1997 
State Share
(Shanghai Municipal Govt.)
Shanghai Dazhong Employee
Shareholders Association
Shanghai Dazhong Taxi Co.,
 Ltd. 
(Listed company)
Dazhong Enterprise Management Company
SDT Co., Ltd. sold a large part of SPDT Co., Ltd.’s
share (20.08%) to DEMC on May, 1997
Shanghai Pudong Dazhong
Taxi Co., Ltd. 
Shanghai Pudong Dazhong Taxi Co., Ltd. 
(Listed company)
26.67%
(No.1)
33.19%(No.1) 20.08%(No.1)
24.74%(No.1)
26.67%(No.1)
90.00%
20.07%
Phase 2: 
Privatization of Dazhong Transportation (Dazhong Taxi, previously) in 1999
State Share
(Shanghai Municipal Govt.)
Dazhong Technologies Co., Ltd.
(Pudong Dazhong Taxi, previously)
State Share
(Shanghai Municipal Govt.)
Shanghai Dazhong Transportation Co., Ltd.
(Shanghai Dazhong Taxi, previously)
Shanghai Dazhong Transportation Co., Ltd.
(Shanghai Dazhong Taxi, previously)
Allotted 140 million increased
shares to DT Co., Ltd. in 1999
Source: Compiled by author based on New Fortune, August 2002 issue and securities-related websites.
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way, Pudong Taxi Co, Ltd. (renamed Dazhong 
Technologies Co, Ltd. then) became the prin-
cipal shareholder with 24.74% of the issued 
shares of Dazhong Transportation Co., Ltd., 
and previous principal shareholder, Shanghai 
municipal government, became the second 
principal shareholder. In this way, the privati-
zation of the two listed companies, Dazhong 
Transportation Co., Ltd. and Dazhong Tech-
nologies Co, Ltd., was actually accomplished 
by employee ownership.
In the case of companies with good busi-
ness results, buyout by management or em-
ployees offers substantial advantages from the 
point of allowing smooth privatization. How-
ever, there are also the disadvantages of not 
being able to expect new capital investment 
from the outside, and the fact that employ-
ee buyout tends to be a hindrance to broad 
reorganization. Diffi culties in raising large 
amount of capital for the management and 
the employees dictate that companies suitable 
for MBO or MEBO privatization would have 
to be limited to comparatively small or medi-
um companies.4 In order to promote privati-
zation for a large number of large companies, 
it is necessary for agents from outside the 
companies to take initiatives in the process of 
privatization.
5.2.4 Private Companies
Buyouts of listed companies by private 
companies have been taking place increas-
ing frequently since 1997. Although it is diffi -
cult to get an accurate picture of the situation 
as no offi cial data has been compiled on this 
trend, an estimate based on announcements 
of transfer of state shares confi rms roughly 40 
cases of state share purchases of listed state-
Figure 4  Buyout of Changzheng Machine Tool by Top Group
Phase 1: 
Changzheng Machine Tool 
acquired 53.85% of the share 
of Chengdu Top, a subsidiary 
of Sichuan Top Technologies 
Corporation, in late 1997, at 
77,910 thousand RMB.
Phase 2:
Zigong City Government sold 
422,620 thousand state-owned 
shares to Top Technologies at 
approximately 89 million 
RMB.
State-owned Asset Management Bureau of
Zigong City 
(The largest shareholder before April 1998)
48.37% (No.1)
48.37% (No.1)
Changzheng Machine Tool, Co., Ltd.
Listed on Shenzhen Exchange in 1995
Sichuan Top Technologies Corporation
[A private software company]
(The largest shareholder after April 1998)
Sichuan Top Software Co., Ltd.
(Changzheng Machine Tool, previously)
Source: Based on interviews to Top Group executives (September 1999) and related articles.
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owned companies by private companies. If 
purchases of state-owned legal persons' shares 
are included, the number of cases of private 
companies buying out listed state-owned en-
terprises will be in fact much higher than the 
estimated fi gure.
In August 2000, the Ministry of Finance, 
in preparation for the divestiture policy of 
state-owned shares on the market, suspended 
new approval of state-owned share transfers to 
private companies. Permission from the Min-
istry of Finance resumed in August 2002, and 
as of September 2002 at least 40 companies 
have achieved agreements for purchase of 
state-owned shares by private companies.
A great majority of the buyouts of list-
ed companies by private companies to date 
has been aimed at obtaining the position of a 
listed company by private companies, which 
have had high hurdles to listing. This kind of 
case is called "shell buying." Recently, none-
theless, there have even been an increasing 
number of cases of buyout aiming to acquire 
the business resources of the company to be 
purchased.
Case 1: Top Group
Purchase of state-owned shares by pri-
vate companies for the purpose of shell buy-
ing has become more common since around 
1998. According to a survey by Misheng Se-
curities Research Institute, there were over 
65 cases of shell buying by August 2002 
(Wangyang Securities Website: http://
www.wangyang.com/webdata/data08/0829/
0829197.html accessed November 25, 2002). 
Let us look at the purchase of Changzheng 
Machine Tool by Top Group, as a representa-
tive case (Figure 4).
Changzheng Machine Tool Co., Ltd. 
was a state-owned machine tool manufacturer 
that belongs to Zigong City, Sichuan Province. 
It was listed in 1995, and since then the man-
agement has consistently deteriorated, and 
in 1997 the company was in danger of falling 
into the red in the next period. 
The company that was to become the 
purchaser, Sichuan Top Technologies Devel-
opment Corporation, is a private enterprise 
mainly involved in the computer software 
business. As a prelude to the buyout, Chang-
zheng Machine Tool purchased 53.85% of 
the shares of Chengdu Top Technologies Co. 
Ltd., a subsidiary of Top Group, at the end 
of 1997. The purchase amount of 77.91 mil-
lion RMB was fi nanced by the Zigong State 
Asset Management Bureau. At the same time, 
Changzheng Machine Tool decided to change 
its principal business area to computer soft-
ware.
In April of the following year, the 
Zigong State Asset Management Bureau 
agreed to transfer all the state shares of 
Changzheng Machine Tool to Top Group for 
89 million RMB. At the same time, the Zigong 
State Asset Management Bureau provided Top 
Group with a loan of 89 million RMB equal to 
the purchase price, to be repaid in six years. 
In other words, Top was able to make the pur-
chase without any cash up front. When the in-
come from the sale of the subsidiary company 
that was a prelude to the buyout is taken into 
account, the fi nal purchase price was only 10 
million RMB.
Through the purchase of state shares, 
Top became the principal shareholder of 
Changzheng Machine Tool with 48.37% of 
its capital. Then in May, the founder of Top, 
Song Ruhua, became the Chairman of Chang-
zheng Machine Tool, and the company name 
was changed to Sichuan Top Changzheng 
Software Co. Ltd. (and afterwards changed to 
Sichuan Top Software Co. Ltd.). After the pur-
chase was complete, Top Software changed its 
principal business area to software manufac-
turing, and the machine tools manufacturing 
business was scaled down and broadly revised 
by measures such focusing on the important 
area of NC machine tools.5 Currently the ma-
chine tools only account for 10% of the com-
pany's sales, and 3% of the revenues.
In the case of shell buying, the main 
purpose of the buyout for the private compa-
ny is to obtain the status of a listed company, 
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above all else. For this reason, the companies 
that are the subject of these buyouts are those 
with deteriorating business results, without ex-
ception, and after the purchase the businesses 
of these companies are completely revamped. 
In the case of Top Group, the machine tools 
business was revised and continued, howev-
er there are many cases where the original 
business of the company has been completely 
eliminated.
Case 2: Delong Group
Next, let us look at the case of the listed 
company purchase by Delong Group, as an 
example of a buyout to obtain the business re-
sources of the company being purchased (Fig-
ure 5).
Delong Group was established by Tang 
Figure 5  Ownership Structure of Delong Group (Summary)
Tang Wanxin Tang Wanli, Tang Wanping, Tang Wanhe
Delong Strategic Investment International
(President: Tang Wanli)
Xinjiang Delong Group Limited Company Shenzhen Development Bank
Co., Ltd.
Xinjing Dunhe Group Limited Company
(President: Tang Wanli)
13.6% (1)
92.0% (1)
90.0% (1)
15.2% (1) 29.7% (1)
30.0% (1)
7.4%
(1)
22.3% (1)
21.9% (1)
1.3% (7)
8.0%
6.7% each (1)
Shenyang Alloyed
Metal Co., Ltd.
Alloyed metal and
metalware
(Acquired in 1997?) 
Xinjiang Dunhe
Investment Co., Ltd.
Food processing and
cement
(Acquired in 2001?)
Zhongyan Tange Feather
and Leather Products
Co., Ltd.
Feather and leather products
(Acquired in 2001?)
Xinjiang Tianshan Cement
Investment Co., Ltd.
Cement manufacturing
(Acquisition plan announced
in 2002)
Xianghuoju Investment Co., Ltd.
Automotive parts
(Acquired in 1997) 
Note: 1 Figures in parenthesis denote ranks as shareholders.
          2 The time of acquisitions are estimated based on disclosed materials.
Source: Same as Figure 2.
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Wanxin and his three brothers from Xinji-
ang, and went on to amass capital in the secu-
rities investment business. In 1997 the broth-
ers advocated conversion to manufacturing 
industries and began preparing in earnest to 
purchase listed state-owned companies. Cur-
rently, the brothers have indirect capital con-
trol of four listed companies, through Delong 
Strategic Investment International, in which 
they have controlling capital. Including the 
project still being planned, it would extend to 
fi ve listed companies in which they have con-
trolling capital, and could be the largest buy-
out of listed state-owned companies by private 
capital.
Although the brothers have invested in 
a diverse range of industries, in recent years 
Delong Group has been focusing most of its 
attention on the automobile industry. Xiang-
huoju Investment Co., Ltd., which the group 
bought in 1999, has 40% of the domestic 
spark plug market for automobile engines, 
and is the number-four company among the 
domestic automobile parts producers. Delong 
Group purchased several automobile parts 
makers through Xianghuoju, and is diversify-
ing the company's products from spark plugs 
to a wide range of other automobile parts.
Currently, Delong is looking to move 
into completed automobile manufacturing, 
and is now planning to arrange a merger with 
two large state-owned heavy truck manufac-
turers, Shaangxi Heavy Truck Factory and 
Chongqing Heavy Truck Factory. Under the 
current plan, Xianghuoju would provide 51% 
of the capital for the merger, and the two 
state-owned companies would provide their 
production facilities and plants. If the merger 
were realized, Delong Group would have con-
trol of a company with the largest share of the 
domestic heavy truck market.
The buyout of listed state-owned com-
panies by private companies has become in-
creasingly common, and as Delong case 
shows, examples are appearing that are linked 
to the revitalization of the purchased compa-
ny and industry reorganization. In the future 
private companies are likely to play the most 
important role as the agents taking initiatives 
in privatizing large state-owned enterprises.
The problem is that the management of 
private companies themselves often lacks sta-
bility. The business results of target compa-
nies after shell buying generally tend to re-
main poor and in some cases they deteriorate 
further. It is pointed out that it is the lack of 
management ability on the part of the private 
company that made the buyout less effective 
in improving performance of target compa-
nies (Wangyang Securities Website, as above).
In the case of Top Group mentioned 
earlier, active investment activities had been 
carried out including the purchase of two 
more listed companies even after the buy-
out of Changzheng Machine Tool. Howev-
er, profi ts in recent years have been poor, 
and the fi nancial situation is deteriorating 
(Southern Weekly, August 29, 2002, http://
www.southerncn.com/weekend/economic/
200208290006.htm accessed November 26, 
2002). In the case of Delong Group, despite 
advocating a change to manufacturing in-
dustries, the company's history of speculative 
stock investment as its main business makes 
it less secured whether the company's real in-
tention is to make long-term industrial invest-
ment.
5.2.5 Foreign-capital Companies
The Chinese government has taken a 
cautious stance towards sales of large state-
owned enterprises to foreign-capital compa-
nies. In 1995, Isuzu Motors and Itochu Corp. 
purchased the legal-persons' shares of Beijing 
Light Bus Co., Ltd., a Shanghai-listed auto-
mobile manufacturer, and by combining the 
shares held by the two companies, they were 
able to become the de facto principal share-
holder. This struck a nerve with the central 
government, which was placing priority on its 
automobile industry policy at the time, and 
the State Council issued an offi cial notice pro-
hibiting, in principle, the purchasing of listed 
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company shares by foreign-capital companies. 
However, as part China's entry into the WTO, 
China has been asked to stop this kind of 
discriminatory treatment of foreign-capital 
companies. The change in policy on selling 
state-owned shares came with the ease in reg-
ulations towards the purchase of state-owned 
companies by foreign-capital companies. In 
September 2002, the government set forth a 
policy of selective approval based on foreign 
investment guidelines for the purchase of list-
ed company shares by foreign-capital compa-
nies.
Shanghai and Shenzhen are the most 
active in the area of selling large state-owned 
enterprises to foreign capital companies. Both 
cities are promoting sales to foreign-capital 
companies even in the fi elds where the par-
ticipation of non state-owned categories has 
been restricted all along, including the cat-
egories of infrastructure and fi nance. In the 
infrastructure category, Shanghai Municipal 
Government sold the Shanghai Waterworks 
Pudong Company, which is a state-owned wa-
ter department, to Vivendi, a French con-
glomerate. In September 2002, Shenzhen an-
nounced a policy to sell 25% to 70% of the 
state-owned shares in fi ve state-owned utility 
companies, including electric, gas, and water 
companies, to foreign-capital fi rms.
In fi nancial sector, the Shanghai Bank 
already received investment from the Hong-
kong and Shanghai Banking Co. Ltd. in 1999, 
and the Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 
Co. Ltd. is now in consultation with Citibank 
for that US bank to obtain an 8% to 10% 
share of the Chinese bank. In these cases, the 
foreign-capital participation has been limit-
ed to fi nancial contributions only. Meanwhile, 
Shenzhen has already reached an agreement 
to sell a majority of the state-owned and legal-
entity shares of the Shenzhen Development 
Bank held through a related institution, to 
the US investment company, Newbridge Capi-
tal.6 If the agreement is realized, it will be the 
fi rst case of a bank affi liated with a local gov-
ernment being bought out with foreign capi-
tal.
The Chinese government is starting to 
introduce foreign capital into even the in-
vestment fund sector. In November 2002, the 
Regulatory Rules on QFII Securities Invest-
ment (QFII: Qualifi ed Foreign Institutional 
Investors) were introduced, which open the 
domestic capital market for foreign institu-
tional investors approved by the Chinese au-
thorities.
Conclusion: Prospects for Privatiza-
tion of Large Companies
With the developments between the 
15th and 16th National Congresses of the 
CPC, the political restrictions on privatiza-
tion have been basically eliminated. Along 
with this, the trend towards privatization of 
large state-owned enterprises has gained mo-
mentum. As was examined in this chapter, in-
stitutional investors, management executives, 
private companies, and foreign-capital com-
panies have been emerging as agents that will 
take initiatives in corporate governance of in 
place of the government.
However, the Chinese market econ-
omy is still at its nascent stage of develop-
ment. The domestic actors that are expected 
to push forward with privatization process do 
not necessarily have suffi cient abilities in fi -
nancing privatization and effi ciently manag-
ing privatized companies. Private companies, 
which are already becoming active in the pur-
chase of state-owned listed companies, have 
their own problems with the lack of their own 
management stability. The Chinese govern-
ment has expectations for the participation of 
foreign-capital fi rms in privatization, however 
foreign capitals' participation in China's priva-
tization market will be more selective in terms 
of profi tability and risk.
In the near future, the trend towards 
privatization will likely be more focused on 
medium-sized companies under the jurisdic-
tion of local governments. The tide of privati-
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zation will reach the largest enterprises under 
the jurisdiction of the central government in 
the long term. However, the larger and more 
complex a company, the greater the degree of 
diffi culty for privatization, and the more time 
needed for its achievement. The mixed sys-
tems of state and private capital existing side 
by side are likely to continue into the long 
term.
(Ken-ichi IMAI)
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